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Abstract 
From the perspective of market microstructure, this paper investigates the relationship between stock 
liquidity, firm investment and capital allocation efficiency. This paper finds that firm investment is 
positively related to stock liquidity. Moreover, financial constraint, firm growth and risk affect the 
relationship between firm investment and stock liquidity. In addition, stock liquidity can help firm 
better utilize investment opportunities, indicated by higher investment and Tobin’ Q sensitivities. We 
also show that firms with good liquidity can lower the investment and Tobin’s Q sensitivities when 
there are no good investment opportunities. The findings of this paper indicate that stock liquidity have 
positive effect on firm investment. Therefore, to strengthen the effectiveness of stock liquidity, the 
Chinese government should continue to reform ownership structure and corporate governance, 
strengthen information disclosure and stepped up its crackdown against inside trading. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate Investment bears close relation to financial and capital allocation, and is of great significance 
to the company’s production and operations, as well as its capital flow and profits in the future. It is 
fundamental to the growth of units in micro economy, and exerts powerful influence on macro 
economy. Thus, it is of important theoretical value and practical significance to study corporate 
investment. In Tobin’s Q theory (1969), investment behavior depends on the investment opportunity 
represented by Tobin Q solely, while scholars suggest setting less rigorous hypothesis (Note 1) 
conditions to obtain more practical explanations, owing to the unsatisfying empirical performance, 
information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and agency costs (Jensen, 1986) in particular. 
Behavioral finance attaches more importance to the influence of invalid capital market on investment 
and financial, with the assumption that investor’s sentiments could affect corporate investment (Barker 
et al., 2003). According to the further research by Munoz (2013), there is a positive correlation between 
stock liquidity and corporate investments (fixed assets, total assets and inventory investment), which 
tends to be more significant for firm with higher financial constraint and better investment 
opportunities. 
Currently, studies relating to corporate investment mainly focus on macro characteristics such as 
monetary policy and government intervention, or micro factors such as financial constraint, agency cost, 
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etc. With neoclassical investment model as its framework, and dynamic panel data model as its tool, 
Fangping Peng and Shaoping Wang (2007) tested empirically the effectiveness of interest rate policy 
from a micro perspective. They found that monetary policies could exert influence on capital cost and 
finally on company’s investment behavior by adjusting interest rate and the yield to maturity of 
national debt. Besides, with Chinese listed manufacturing companies from 2004 to 2011 as analysis 
sample, Guangming Gong and Si Meng (2012) found that tight monetary policy constrained corporate 
investment, while loose monetary policy could promote it. The tighter the constraint was, the greater 
the influence of monetary policy had on corporate investment. Additionally, Zhongming Cheng et al. 
(2008) and Haiyan Zhong et al. (2010) assume that, owing to local government’s social objective of 
promoting economic growth and lowering unemployment rate, and the local functionaries’ appeal for 
promotion, listed companies under their control are forced to attain those social and political goals. For 
instance, local companies are demanded to participate in the construction of infrastructure i.e., energy, 
communications, etc. They also shoulder the responsibility of conducting merger or acquisition of 
state-owned companies through financial channel, for the purpose of eliminating poverty, financial 
deficit and unemployment rate locally. Accordingly, local companies are deflected from the goal of 
benefit maximization, which leads to overinvestment. To sum up, all the empirical evidence above 
shows that there is a positive correlation between government intervention and the overinvestment of 
local state-owned enterprises. 
For the information asymmetry and adverse selection between company management and outside 
shareholders and creditor, the external financial cost exceeds its internal capital, which leads to 
insufficient capital and investment constraint in the company. Academically, investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is employed to measure investment constraint (1988). Wei Feng (1999), Feng Wei and Xing 
Liu (2004) studied Chinese listed companies, and found that the sensitivity was higher in companies 
under tighter investment constraint. These companies had to compromise the investment opportunity 
whose NPV is greater than zero for underinvestment (2009). According to Jensen (1986), if the 
manager focuses on expansion of scale, the company’s cash flow may be directed to projects with NPV 
less than zero, which exhibits a correlation between investment and the change of cash flow. Jingeng 
He and Jiahua Ding’s (2001) finding showed that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of listed 
company was determined by agency cost. Yujun Lian and Jian Cheng (2007) also found that companies 
under less financial constraint had the tendency to overinvestment, and agency cost determined 
investment-cash flow sensitivity; while companies under tighter financial constraint tend to under 
invest, and its investment-cash flow sensitivity was mainly caused by information asymmetry. 
So far, there are seldom studies concerning corporate investment from market microstructure’s 
perspective. On April 29th 2005, share-split reform was implemented, which signifies the full 
circulation of A-share market, and the restructuring of dualistic ownership structure. Besides, due 
considerations were given to the common benefit of corporate governance, stock price and liquidity by 
major shareholders and its agents. With this in mind, the paper investigate the internal relationship 
among stock liquidity, scale of corporate investment and investment efficiency using Chinese listed 
non-financial companies from 1998 to 2011.  
The contribution and innovation of the paper embodies in the following facets. Firstly, the paper 
investigates stock liquidity’s influence on investment scale and capital efficiency of listed companies 
from the perspective of market microstructure, and further studies the function of financial constraint 
and risks of operations. Secondly, the paper demonstrates liquidity’s function in corporate governance 
from the perspective of investment level and investment efficiency. Additionally, various methods are 
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employed to measure liquidity and corporate investment, with SSE 180 index for robust analysis. The 
paper will generate valuable suggestion for elevating capital efficiency from the perspective of market 
microstructure. Lastly, studying company’s financial behavior from the perspective of market 
microstructure can push forward cross-disciplinary research.  
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 for research hypothesis and econometric 
model; chapter 3 for description of variables and data; chapter 4 for the result of empirical research; 
chapter 5 for the influence of SSE 180 index adjustment on stock liquidity and corporate investment; 
chapter 6 for robust analysis; and the last part for summary. 
 
2. Research Hypothesis and Econometric Model 
2.1 Stock Liquidity and the Scale of Corporate Investment  
According to the existing researches, stock liquidity often exerts its influence on the scale of corporate 
investment through the following five channels, the first one being mispricing mechanism. Miller 
(1977) assumes that, in a market teemed with heterogeneous beliefs, optimistic investors (with high 
expected yield) make high valuation on stocks, while pessimistic investors would quit the stock market 
owing to short sale constraint. In fact, the stock price reflects the higher valuation of optimistic 
investors. When the company conducts financial for investment opportunity, the heterogeneous beliefs 
in investors can expand demand in the market and promote the issuing of stocks. For this reason, the 
scales of corporate financial and investment have a positive correlation with heterogeneous beliefs of 
investors. 
Besides, the previous research also shows that the more the heterogeneous belief distinctions are, the 
larger the stock trade volume would be (Hong & Stein, 2007). Baker and Stein (2004) assume that 
liquidity can be elevated in a market under short sale constraint, only if irrational traders tend to be 
optimistic. Therefore, liquidity also is the indication of the investors’ sensitivity. Combine with 
Miller’s (1997) theory; it is safe to conclude that liquidity is in positive correlation with corporate 
investment. Still, the conclusion above is drawn through the reflection of heterogeneous beliefs by 
trade volume and liquidity. 
From the researches above, heterogeneous beliefs exerts its influence on corporate investment through 
the channel of bond. Polk and Sapienza (2009) once studied the catering theory, which means company 
management could adjust corporate investment to cater for investors’ sentiments. On account of 
information asymmetry, investors could only evaluate the company through its investment behavior. In 
case that the company rejects the projects that investors deem as profitable, they would sell of their 
stock, which might arouse more pressure on company management. Min Pan and Dixing Zhu (2011) 
found that the influence of investor sentiment on corporate investment through financial and catering 
channel tend to be more powerful in the upturn period, compared with the downturn period.  
The second factor is capital cost. Amihud and Mendlson (1986) assume that investors might take 
liquidity cost into consideration before investing, so that stocks with less liquidity have a higher trade 
cost, and are expected for a higher rate of return. They conducted empirical research on bid-ask spread, 
and noticed that it is in positive correlation with the rate of return expected. Likewise, Amihud (2002), 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measured liquidity through different ways and found that liquidity was in 
negative correlation with the rate of return expected. As a matter of fact, expected return rate of 
financial assets is equivalent to the discount rate of projects (Ross et al., 2009). Thus, higher stock 
liquidity would lower the discount rate and expand company’s investment opportunity set.  
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp               Journal of Business Theory and Practice                  Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016 
28 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
The third factor is the cost of equity issuing. When issuing stock, the company has to pay offering fee 
(for underwriting and publicity in investment bank). Bulter et al. (2005) found that stock liquidity was 
in negative correlation with offering cost, because underwriters were confronted with decreasing 
inventory cost, searching cost and trade cost when liquidity was improved. Naikang Gu and Hui Chen 
(2010) studied supplement offerings and allotment in A-share market between July 2000 and April 
2005, and found that the higher the liquidity was, the lower the cost for supplement offering and 
allotment would be.  
The fourth factor is feedback mechanism in trade. Khanna and Sonti (2004) consider that informed 
trading can change the stock price and the indication of stock price. The behavior of informed traders 
can help with the improvement of decision-making efficiency, as well as the performance and financial 
constraint in the company. Higher liquidity can promote the trade with informed traders (Kyle & Vila, 
1991) and strengthen the feedback effect. 
The last factor is the market for corporate control. Stein (1988) deems that information asymmetry may 
lure CEOs into sacrificing long-term investment for a better short-term performance. On account of the 
late return and high risk of long-term investment, the stock price might be underestimated and more 
pressure are caused on company management. Likewise, Poter (1992) states that liquidity facilitates 
short-term trade by lowering the trade cost. With much focus on short-term benefit, company 
management may cut long-term investment like R&D to keep short-term profit, which causes the lack 
of long-term investment.  
As to the empirical evidences, Munoz (2013) analyzed the quarterly data of listed companies in Latin 
America (Argentina, Brazil, Chili and Mexico) between 1990 and 2010, measuring stock liquidity by 
turnover rate, and found that liquidity was in positive correlation with corporate investment (fixed asset, 
total asset, and inventory investment). The relation tends to me more palpable in companies under 
financial constraint and growth-type companies. Fang et al. (2013) carried out empirical analysis using 
minimum tick size change in American market and found that liquidity could lower innovation through 
the function of takeover pressure and short-term investors. With this in mind, the paper comes up with 
the first competitive hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: stock liquidity is in positive correlation with the scale of corporate investment. 
Hypothesis 1b: stock liquidity is in negative correlation with the scale of corporate investment. 
According to the theory of Fazzari et al. (1988) and Munoz (2013), the following panel data model is 
employed to test the first hypothesis: 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1it it it it it it itINV LIQ Q CFO               X W              (1) 
In this model, INVit stands for the investment level of company i in the year t (after the adjustment of 
total asset at the end of last year). LIQit-1 represents the liquidity of company i in the year t-1. Qit-1 and 
CFOit-1 respectably stand for the Tobin Q of company i in the year t-1 and the cash flow after the 
adjustment of total asset. Xit-1 includes scale, liabilities, revenue, cash, corporate age and other variables 
relating to the company. Wit refers to the industry and year dummies. Torelieve the endogeneity, all the 
explanatory variables are lagged for one year. 
2.2 Stock Liquidity and the Corporate Investment Efficiency 
In Tobin’s (1969) theory, the marginal value of Q is the indication of real investment level in perfect 
capital market. Tobin Q provides a measure for investors to evaluate the investment opportunity, in 
which process the sensitivity between capital investment and Tobin Q is increased. However, owing to 
information asymmetry and the striking distinction between internal and external financial cost, 
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financial constraint often leads to underinvestment (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Still, agency problem 
pushes the managers into extension of corporate scale, which may cause overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). 
Besides, inefficient capital market, defected corporate bond market and the discrimination from bank 
credit give rise to financial constraint. Yujun Lian and Zhi Su (2009) raised that investment level of 
listed companies was constrained to 20-30% lower than the optimum situation, with the average 
investment efficiency being 72%. Plus government intervention and internal control, Chineselisted 
companies are under the common situation of overinvestment (Cheng et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2010). 
The question is, whether stock liquidity has a certain impact on investment efficiency of listed 
companies? 
Firstly, based on the previous analysis, companies can take advantage of the mispricing mechanism to 
finance by issuing stock with lower cost. Here, the feedback of informed investors can offset the impact 
of financial constraint, thus the investment opportunity set is expanded owing to less capital cost. From 
this aspect, stock liquidity, indeed, alleviates financial constraint and underinvestment of the company, 
elevating investment efficiency. 
Secondly, the supervision mechanism of major shareholders matters. It is Maug’s (1998) theory that the 
blockholders can elevate the stock price. If blockholders could purchase additional shares at the lower 
price that do not reflects the benefits of supervision, they could gain profit from the original and 
additional shares. The more the liquidity is, the more the possibility for major shareholders to gain 
profit. Consequently, they will conduct supervision positively, so the agency cost of managers is 
lowered and the efficiency of operations improved.  
The third aspect is the incentive contract of CEO. In the theoretical model of Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1993), the marginal value of personal information increased with the increased stock liquidity, which 
makes uninformed investors pay extra fee to gain the information and the same edge as informed 
investors. Thus, the characteristics of the company find expression in its stock price, which indicates 
the company’s basic situation and managers’ behavior. As a result, CEO can gain more profit from it 
and earn much more return from the stock. Dongwei Su and Jiacai Xiong (2013) measured CEO’s 
payment-stock price sensitivity through the sensitivity Delta value of stocks and options hold by CEO. 
They found that from the year 2005 to 2011, the correlation between stock liquidity and the sensitivity 
tend to be the shape of a vertical letter “U”. A reasonable and effective payment contract can strengthen 
the partnership of shared interests and risks between managers and shareholders, elevate the moral of 
company management, and lower agency cost. According to Lv Changjiang and Zhang Haiping (2011), 
the encouraging mechanism of stock options can tackle with problems such as overinvestment and 
underinvestment, thus raising the investment efficiency. 
The fourth facet is stock price informativeness. According to Kyle and Vila (1991), rising liquidity can 
minimize the impact on stock price when investors sell or buy stocks. Informed blockholders can buy a 
bulk of stocks with much lower price from noise traders and gain profit, then major shareholders are 
willing to gather more information. That’s how liquidity works on increasing information in stock price. 
When stock price is associated with information effectively, it can indicate the situation of the company, 
and cope with information asymmetry and financial constraint (Durnev et al., 2011). The supervision 
(Yang, 2010) from outside investors alike can be strengthened. Additionally, stock price with effective 
information can help with management’s decision making in terms of market demand, prediction of the 
industry, thus improving investment decision and increasing profit of shareholders (Chen et al., 2007). 
The last mechanism is the exit threats of block holders. According to the findings of Adamati, 
Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009), stock option encouragement and CEO’s detrimental opportunism 
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may make informed traders sell off their stock, leading to slump in stock price and CEO’s 
remuneration. Here, liquidity encourages informed traders to gather information and conduct trades, 
arousing more violent fluctuation in stock price and CEO’s remuneration. That is to say, with higher 
liquidity, CEO shall not resort to opportunism to prevent negative impacts.  
However, liquidity might trim investment efficiency as well. According to Goldsterin and Guembel 
(2008), liquidity may lower the capital efficiency when feedback effect of stock price is valued by 
company management. Uninformed traders cut stock price by selling off to mislead the management. If 
the management accounts it for the impact of negative information and withdraws its investment, 
investors can benefit a lot from this behavior. The higher the liquidity is, the more profit investors can 
gain, and the more distorted the investment would be. With all these considered, the second 
competitive hypothesis is raised.  
Hypothesis 2a: stock liquidity can raise the investment efficiency. 
Hypothesis 2b: stock liquidity lowers the investment efficiency. 
According to the theory of Bushman (2011) and the non-linear relation between investment and 
investment opportunity, the following panel data model is set to test the second hypothesis.  
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4 1 1
5 1 1
* * *
           
it it it it it it it it
it it it it
INV LIQ Q LIQ Q NEG LIQ Q
CFO
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   
     
 
    
   X W         (2) 
In this model, NEGit stands for dummy variable of the lowering investment opportunity. When the 
investment opportunity Qit of this year is less than the value Qit-1 of last year, NEGit’s value should be 1, 
or it should be 0. 3  measures liquidity’s impact on capital investment and the sensitivity of 
investment opportunity. 4  measures liquidity’s extra sensitivity to capital investment and the 
decreasing investment opportunity. 
 
3. Variables and Data 
3.1 Corporate Investment 
In a general sense, corporate investment covers the wide range of fixed assets, intangible assets, merger 
and acquisition, R&D, advertising spending, etc. On account of the discontinuity of merger and 
acquisition and the difficulty in gathering its data, the corporate investment discussed in this paper is 
narrowed down to fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term investment. It is calculated by the 
difference between the item “the cash on fixed assets, intangible assets and other assets” and “net cash 
flow withdrawn from fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets” in cash flow statement. 
The standardized value INV1it is generated after divided by the total assets of last year, for the purpose 
of eliminating the impact of the difference in corporate scale. This method is adopted by Qingquan Xin 
(2007), Yujun Lian, Zhi Su (2009) and Jiwei Yang (2010) to measure corporate investment.  
Besides, according to the method raised by Pan Tong and Zhengfei Lu (2005), the corporate investment 
in the paper is measured by the annual variation of fixed assets, building projects and project material. 
It is also divided by the total assets of last year to generate a standardized index INV2it for robust 
analysis. 
3.2 Stock Liquidity 
Stock liquidity denotes the capability of market to trade assets at a reasonable price, manifested in 4 
facets including width index (the difference between transaction price and middle price), depth index 
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(amount of stocks traded at the offering quotation), market resiliency (the recovery speed from 
unbalanced agency), and transaction immediacy (time spent to draw a successful transaction). It can be 
measured by spread, turnover rate and indicator of price’s impact. With difficulty in gathering data and 
computing cost, the paper adopts the following 6 methods to measure liquidity. 
3.2.1 Bid-Ask Spread (ROLL) 
In Roll’s (1984) hypothesis, the real value of stock is subjected to random walking, so that the stock 
price ,it dp on day d is equivalent to the real value adding or minus half of the effective spread. With all 
this considered, the spread can be measured by the sequence of stock price variation
 , , 12 cov ,it it d it dS p p     . In this formula, Sit stands for spread and ,it dp for stock price variation. 
The formula cannot be applied to the situation when the value of variables is greater than zero, so that a 
revised ROLL is defined in the paper.  
   
 
, , 1 , , 1
, , 1
2 cov , ,  cov , 0
0,  cov , 0
 

          
it d it d it d it d
it
it d it d
p p if p p
ROLL
if p p
         (3) 
3.2.2 Bid-Ask Spread (HL) 
Corwin and Schultz (2012) have found another method to measure spread, which is based on two facts: 
firstly, the maximum or minimum price is subjected to selling or sale respectively, thus their ratio can 
reflect fluctuation of stocks and the spread; secondly, the fluctuation indicated from the ratio is in 
proportion to the return interval, but spread variables remain the same. Therefore, the spread can be 
measured by the ratio of maximum and minimum price in one or two days: 
 2 e -1
S
1 e
it
itit

                                (4) 
2 2
1
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j it d j it d d
H H
E
L L
          (5) 
,
o
it dH  and ,
o
it dL  stand for the maximum and minimum price of stock i on day d of the year t 
respectively. , , 1
o
it d dH   and , , 1
o
it d dL   refer to the maximum and minimum price of stock i on day d and 
d+1 of the year t respectively. The larger the spread is, the less the liquidity will be.  
3.2.3 Daily Average Turnover Rate (TOVER) 
TOVERit  1Dit
(
VOLitd
LNSitd
)
d1
Dit                            (6) 
VOLitd refers to the trade volume of stock i on day d of the year t. LNSitd stands for the amount of stock i 
in circulation on day d of the year t. Dit is the total trading days of year t. 
3.2.4 Illiquidity Index (ILLIQ) 
ILLIQit  1Dit
(
ritd
Vitd
)
d1
Dit 100                         (7) 
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In this formula, ritd and Vitd stand for the return rate and transaction volume of reinvestment in stock i on 
day d of the year t respectively, without consideration of dividend. D refers to total trading days, and｜
ritd｜/Vitd is the change in price as the volume increases by one million. Its annual average multiply 100 
is the illiquidity index. The larger ILLIQ index is, the great the impact of trade volume on stock price 
would be, which shows less liquidity, and verse visa. The index is raised by Amihud (2002), and has 
found wide application. 
3.2.5 Liquidity Ratio (LR)  
9
1
1 ( ) 10
itD
itd
it
dit itd
VLR
D r


                             (8) 
Vitd/｜ritd｜shows the transaction amount which could alter the price by 1%, whose average divided by 
109 is liquidity index. The larger LR is, the less the impact on stock price would be, which shows higher 
liquidity. 
3.2.6 Return Reversal (GAM) 
According to the theory of Pastor and Stambaug (2003), stocks with less liquidity may overshoot 
against order flow to a certain trade volume, thus leading to return reversal. They suggest measuring 
liquidity by return reversal. By substituting of stock i’s trade data in year t in the following regression 
equation:  
, , 1 , , , , , , , , , , , 1( )
e e
i t d i t i t i t d i t i t d i t d i t dr r sign r v                         (9 
ritd and Vitd stand for the return rate and transaction volume of reinvestment in stock i on day d of the 
year t respectively, without consideration of dividend. rmtd refers to the weighted return rate, and 
, , , , , ,
e
i t d i t d m t dr r r   is abnormal return rate. When x is 0, the value of Sign(x) also is 0; its value is 1 
(-1) when x is greater (smaller) than zero. The larger return reversal index GAM=|γit| is, the more return 
reversal would be, and the less liquidity is. 
3.3 Financial Constraint 
Financial constraint refers to the restriction on corporate investment owing to imperfect capital market 
and the difference between external and internal financial cost. Scholars remain divided in the 
measurement of financial constraint. In previous studies, prior criteria i.e., dividend payout ratio, frim 
size, bond rating, leverage ratio (Lian & Cheng, 2007; Almeida et al., 2004; Gilchrist & Himmlber, 
1995) and others, were employed to measure financial constraint. To ensure robustness, the paper 
adopts firm size, dividend payout ratio and interest coverage ration as the measurement of financial 
constraint. According to Almeida (2004)’s method, the SIZE value is divided into 3 groups each year 
with the 33rd and 66th percentiles as dividing points, and DSIZE value is 3 for samples after the 66th 
percentile; 1 for samples before the 33rd percentile and 2 for samples in the second group. Likewise, 
variables DCASHDIV and DTIER are defined by dividend payout ratio and interest coverage ration 
respectively.  
3.3.1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
Companies of smaller scale are in operation for a shorter period with less records of operations and 
credit, thus they are confronted with much more information asymmetry. Compared with the larger 
scale of companies, especially those in new industry with much more intangible assets, their collateral 
for loan is of less value, and it costs much in financial constraint (Almeida et al., 2004; Gilchrist & 
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Himmlberg, 1995). This criterion is employed by Almeida (2004), Munoz (2013), Lian and Jian 
(2007). 
3.3.2 Dividend Payout Ratio (CASHDIV) 
Dividend payout is a sliding item of the company with lower adjustment cost apart from other profit 
distribution items, so that paying out large amount of dividend is against the goal of maximum profit 
for a company with higher external financial cost and excellent investment opportunity. This index is 
used by Fazzari (1988), Almeida (2011) and Wei Feng (2004). 
3.3.3 Interest Cover Ration (TIER) 
This index is capable of measuring both solvency and profitability. The higher the index is, the more 
investment capital the company is holding, and the less financial constraint there is. Contrarily, a lower 
index indicates the need of external financial, thus leading to financial constraint. Feng Wei, Xing Liu 
(2004) and Jiwei Yang (2010) both adopt the index to measure financial constraint.  
3.4 Operating Risk 
The paper adopts two methods to measure business risk, that is, the standard deviation of ROA 
(STDROA) from the year t-2 to year t, and the annual fluctuation variance of stock return (SIGMA). The 
paper defines variables of business risk as DSTDROA and DSIGMA in the same way as financial 
constrain. 
3.5 Investment Opportunity (Q) 
Generally speaking, investment opportunity of the company is in positive correlation with the size of 
company. Tobin Q is used as the criterion to measure investment opportunity, and non-circulating 
market value is represented by non-circulating equity multiplying net assets per share. On account of 
the ineffective capital market, the paper uses the annual growth rate of revenue (SGROW) for robust 
analysis with reference to Qingquan Xin (2007)’s method.  
3.6 Cash Flow (CFO) 
Fazzari (1988) holds that, in imperfect capital market, the difference between external and internal 
financial cost leads to financial constraint and the reliance on internal cash flow. The paper adopts the 
standardized net cash flow CFO in operations as the criterion. 
3.7 Other control (Xit) 
1) SIZE: natural logarithm of ending total assets; 
2) LEV: the ratio of ending total liability to ending total assets; 
3) SALES: the ratio of sales revenue to ending total assets; 
4) CASH: the ratio of monetary fund to ending total assets; 
5) AGE: listed years of the company. 
3.8 Industry and Year Fixed Effect (Kit) 
The paper set up 20 years and industry dummy variables based on type M of comprehensive industry, 
according to the classification established by CSRC. 
3.9 Data 
The paper selects Chinese nonifinancial listed companies from 1998 to 2011, gathering data relating to 
stock trade and corporate finance from CSMAR database developed by GTA Company of Shenzhen. 
All the extreme values of variables within 1% are winsorized. The definition of variables and data are 
shown in Table 1 as follows. 
The average and median of corporate investment INV1 (INV2) are 0.069 (0.044) and 0.042 (0.014), and 
its standard deviation is 0.085 (0.122), which shows the striking distinction among different companies. 
The average and standard deviation of ILLIQ are 0.305 and 0.395, exhibiting different liquidity of 
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stocks. 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Data（1998-2011） 
Variable Definition Sample Average Standard 
Deviation
Median Minimum Maximum
INV1 Capital Investment 1 15705 0.069 0.085 0.042 -0.067 0.439 
INV2 Capital Investment 2 16905 0.044 0.122 0.014 -0.256 0.644 
ROLL Roll (1984) Spread 19224 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.030 
HL Corwin (2012) Spread 19196 0.046 0.013 0.044 0.023 0.083 
TOVER Daily Turnover Rate 19354 2.738 2.546 2.013 0.293 16.07 
ILLIQ Illiquidity Rate 19355 0.305 0.395 0.158 0.005 2.286 
LR Liquidity Rate 19366 2.291 3.526 1.094 0.103 26.10 
GAM Return Reversal Index 19196 0.102 0.158 0.042 0 0.951 
Q Tobin Q  19465 1.683 1.026 1.360 0.812 7.459 
SGROW Sales Growth 17966 0.234 0.638 0.143 -0.840 4.571 
CFO Net Cash Flow/Total Assets 19685 0.044 0.083 0.043 -0.216 0.279 
SIZE Ln (Total Assets in the end) 19687 21.28 1.203 21.14 10.84 28.28 
LEV Total Liability/Total Assets 19687 0.496 0.290 0.477 0.055 2.253 
SALES Revenue/Total Assets 19635 0.632 0.467 0.517 0.033 2.571 
CASH Cash holding/Total Assets 19687 0.178 0.148 0.136 0.003 0.723 
AGE Listed Years 19690 7.599 4.743 7 1 19 
TIER Interest cover ratio  15764 9.577 14.61 4.276 -4.782 56.98 
CASHDIV Dividend payout 19679 0.088 0.149 0.030 0 3.997 
STDROA Standard Deviation of ROA from 
year t-2 to year t 15564 
0.036 0.049 0.018 0 0.352 
SIGMA Standard Deviation of Return  18266 0.032 0.015 0.029 0.015 0.124 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Figure 1-6 show the relation between capital investment and 6 liquidity indexes. The observed values 
of samples are equally divided into 5 groups, then the INVI average of each group is calculated and 
exhibited in figures. As is shown in Figure 4, capital investment INVI drops as ILLIQ rises. That is to 
say, liquidity is in positive correlation with corporate investment.  
The result of univariate analysis is shown in Figure 2. Samples are divided into 2 groups by the median 
of liquidity. Then, INVI average, median and variance of each group are calculated. INVI average 
(median) of the group with ILLIQ larger than the median reads 0.058 (0.032), while the result of the 
other group reads 0.079 (0.052) with a significance level of 1%. The results remain nearly the same 
when tested by other indexes. 
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Figure 1. INV1 and ROLL 
 
 
Figure 2. INV1 and HL 
 
 
Figure 3. INV1 and TOVER 
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Figure 4. INV1 and ILLIQ 
 
 
Figure 5. INV1 and LR 
 
 
Figure 6. INV1 and GAM 
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 Less than median Great than Median Change in 
averages 
Change in 
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Average Median Standard 
Deviation 
ROLL 0.070 0.043 0.086 0.067 0.041 0.083 2.168** 1.856* 
HL 0.075 0.049 0.086 0.062 0.035 0.083 9.973*** 14.342*** 
TOVE 0.069 0.043 0.082 0.069 0.040 0.088 -0.050  2.987*** 
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R 
ILLIQ 0.079 0.052 0.089 0.058 0.032 0.079 15.614*** 20.238*** 
LR 0.057 0.032 0.079 0.080 0.053 0.089 -16.747*** -21.218*** 
GAM 0.077 0.050 0.087 0.060 0.034 0.082 12.000*** 15.669*** 
Note: *** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%; 
The comparison of averages is conducted by T test, and the median comparison is tested by Wilconox. 
 
4.2 Stock Liquidity and Capital Investment: Mulitvarirate Regression Analysis 
Figure 3 shows the result of panel data regression (1) from 1998 to 2011. Column (i) to column (vi) 
measure liquidity respectively by different methods i.e., ROLL, HL, TOVER, ILLIQ, LR and GAM. The 
explained variable is capital investment INVI (Note 2). 
As is shown in Table 3, when liquidity is measured by TOVER and LR, their coefficients should be 
greater than zero with a significance level of 1% (referring to column iii and v), which signifies the fact 
that the size of company grows as liquidity increases. When daily average turnover rate increases by 
one standard variation, corporate investment increases by 0.51%. Compared with the INV1 average of 
6.9%, the impact of turnover rate tends to be more powerful. When HL, ILLIQ and GAM are employed, 
their coefficients should be less than zero with a significance level of 1%. That is to say, hypothesis 1a 
holds true, and liquidity is positively correlate with corporate investment. 
As to the impact of company-level variables on corporate investment, the coefficient of Tobin Q is 
greater than zero with a significance level of 1%, which means that investment scale expands with 
investment opportunity, a conclusion similar to that of Xin Qingquan (2007). Coefficient of CFO is 
greater than zero with a significance level of 1%, which means capital investment increases with more 
internal capital, a conclusion similar to that of Fazzari (1988). Coefficient of SIZE is greater than zero 
with a significance level of 1%, showing that capital investment increases with corporate scale. Besides, 
coefficients of LEV and AGE are less than zero with a significance level of 1%, indicating that 
companies with high financial leverage and older age have less capital investment. The conclusion is 
compatible with that of Xin Qingquan (2007).  
 
Table 3. Liquidity and INV1: Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR② (vi) GAM 
Liquidityit-1 0.0780 -0.462*** 0.002*** -0.014*** 0.001*** -0.025*** 
(0.146) (0.107) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) 
Q it-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZE it-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006***  0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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CASH it-1 0.013 0.012 0.0050 0.011 0.009 0.012 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
AGE it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.100*** -0.070*** -0.127*** -0.057** 0.073*** -0.074*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) 
N 15304 15278 15404 15405 15416 15278 
R2 0.172 0.174 0.173 0.174 0.166 0.174 
F 40.79 40.86 41.82 41.71 44.07 41.13 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects; values in the brackets are standard 
variations of robust analysis;  
*** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
 
4.3 The Mediating Effects of Financial Constraints, Growth Opportunities, Operating Risks 
According to conclusions in previous chapters, liquidity is in positive correlation with corporate 
investment. Therefore, it is natural to analyze that heterogeneity of liquidity in different companies.  
In imperfect capital market, investment is constrained by the difference between external and internal 
financial cost. With higher liquidity, the company can finance with lower cost by mispricing. Feedback 
from informed traders alike, helps relieve financial constrain, which makes it possible for companied 
under constraint to finance and increase investment. Ample internal capital and low financial cost lead 
to little demand for capital in companies without constraint, which are less sensitive to liquidity. 
Growth phase is capable of adjusting liquidity as well. According to Zhang (2007), growth-type 
companies with more investment opportunity are better at seizing a fine opportunity to invest. 
Contrarily, value-type companies with less investment opportunity tend to make more steady moves. A 
reasonable explanation is that value-type companies are less likely to cut capital investment when 
loaded with unproductive capital in unfavorable situation, considering the irreversibility of investment. 
Under favorable economic environment, growth-type companies are prone to increase investment, 
while value-type ones can put unproductive capital in use, thus lessening its demand for investment 
expansion. Therefore, growth-type companies can make better use of liquidity for increasing 
investment. According to Munoz (2013), liquidity is of positive correlation with corporate investment 
(fixed assets, total assets and inventory investment), which is more palpable in companies under 
financial constraint.  
As to the findings of Khanna and Sonti (2004), informed traders help adding information indicated in 
stock price, thus improving financial constraint and decision-making efficiency. Subrahmanyam and 
Tittman (2001) hold that feedback mechanism’s impact is stronger under a less favorable 
company-shareholder relationship or much operating uncertainties, for the positive information 
reflected from stock price promotes shareholders’ confidence in stock and the trade. It benefits 
operating efficiency and corporate value as well. With all this considered, the paper predicts that 
liquidity’s impact is more palpable in growth-type companies under financial constraint and higher 
operating risks.  
According to Feng Wei, Xing Liu (2004) and Jiwei Yang (2010), interest cover ratio (DTIER) is 
employed to measure financial (Note 3), and its relation with liquidity is also reflected by the 
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correlation term in regression equation (1). Possible results are shown in Table 4, where column (i) to 
column (vi) adopt 6 different indexes i.e., ROLL, HL, TOVER, ILLIQ, LR and GAM, to measure 
liquidity respectively. It is clear that in the results measured by index ROLL, HL, ILLIQ and GAM, their 
coefficients are less than zero with a significance level of 1%. The correlation term is positive with a 
significance level of 1%, indicating a tighter financial constraint (and a lower DTIER), so that liquidity 
can exert more impact on corporate investment. With TOVER as the criterion, its coefficient is negative 
with a significance level of 5%, while the coefficient of TOVER and DTIER’s correlation term is 
positive. That being the case, turnover rate shows a negative correlation with corporate investment, and 
the company will suffer tighter constraint, which means liquidity might hinder investment, a 
phenomenon against the paper’s conclusion. By liquidity index, LR shows positive value with a 
significance level of 5%, and the correlation term of LR and TIER has a coefficient of 0 insignificantly. 
Thus, financial constraint is not subjected to LR. Generally speaking, the result in Table 4 exhibits that 
financial constraint can adjust the relation between liquidity and corporate investment.  
 
Table 4. Liquidity, TIER and INV1 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
Liquidityit-1 -1.272*** -0.755*** -0.002** -0.046*** 0.002** -0.093*** 
(0.212) (0.112) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) 
Liquidityit-1 
*DTIER 
0.647*** 0.182*** 0.001*** 0.017*** 0 0.038*** 
(0.079) (0.022) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Q it-1 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.139*** 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZE it-1 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006***  0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.010 0.008 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
AGE it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.093*** -0.063*** -0.114*** -0.062*** 0.071*** -0.081*** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.023) 
N 15304 15278 15404 15405 15416 15278 
R2 0.177 0.179 0.175 0.180 0.166 0.179 
F 40.14 40.38 41.30 43.20 41.98 43.30 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects; 
*** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
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The paper measures growth (note 4) by BM, referring to the method of DTIER. Samples are ranked by 
BM, then equally organized into 3 groups. The DBM value of samples over 66 percentile is 3; those 
under 33 percentile is 1; and the value of the second group is 2. The correlation term is also added to 
regression equation (1). Table 5 shows the result by prediction. The results of ROLL, HL, ILLIQ and 
GAM show that their coefficients and the correlation term are positive with a significance level of 1%, 
indicating the possibility of investment expansion in growth-type companies with rising liquidity, 
which is with the conclusion of Munoz (2013). Besides, the coefficients of TOVER and LR is not that 
significant, but those of correlation terms are significantly positive. It can be inferred that liquidity may 
reduce investment of companies growing better, which is against the expectation of the paper. In 
summary, results in Table5 exhibit that the influence of liquidity on investment is heterogeneous in 
different growth-type companies.  
 
Table 5. Liquidity, Growth and Corporate Investment INV1 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
Liquidityit-1 -0.486** -0.626*** 0 -0.025*** -0.001 -0.029*** 
(0.238) (0.119) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) 
Liquidityit-1 
*DBM 
0.288*** 0.104*** 0.001** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.002 
(0.093) (0.027) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Q it-1 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.152*** 0.143*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZE it-1 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005***  0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.023*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.013 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.012 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
AGE it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.085*** -0.051** -0.112*** -0.048** 0.070*** -0.073*** 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) 
N 15304 15278 15404 15405 15416 15278 
R2 0.173 0.175 0.173 0.174 0.167 0.174 
F 40.53 40.98 41.44 41.92 41.71 40.32 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects; values in the brackets are standard 
variations of robust analysis; 
*** indicates the significance level of 1%;  
** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
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Operating risks (Note 5) are measured by ROA’s standard deviation (STDROA) from year t-2 to year t, 
and the correlation term is added in regression equation (1) as well to measure its function. As is shown 
in Table 4, when liquidity is measured by ROLL, HL, ILLIQ and GAM, their correlation terms are 
positive at the 1% significance. Thus, liquidity’s influence on investment is more powerful as operating 
risks grow. The coefficients of TOVER and LR are positive with a significance level of 1%, while the 
correlation term of TOVER and DSTDROA is negative with a significance level of 1%, so that 
liquidity’s impact is lessened when uncertainties increase. This conclusion is contradictory to the 
paper’s prediction. Generally speaking, results in Table 6 shows that liquidity’s impact on investment is 
more powerful in companies under higher operating risks. 
 
Table 6. Liquidity, Operating Risks and Corporate Investment INV1 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
Liquidityit-1 0.688*** -0.260** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001*** -0.008 
(0.209) (0.118) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.009) 
Liquidityit-1* 
DSTDROA 
-0.307*** -0.086*** -0.001*** -0.007*** 0 -0.007** 
(0.075) (0.020) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Q it-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZE it-1 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006***  0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.003 0 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.013 0.012 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.012 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
AGE it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.091*** -0.061** -0.118*** -0.052** 0.071*** -0.072*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.023) 
N 15304 15278 15404 15405 15416 15278 
R2 0.173 0.175 0.174 0.175 0.166 0.174 
F 40.66 40.64 41.29 41.51 41.91 40.55 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects;  
*** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
 
4.4 Stock Liquidity and Investment Efficiency 
Table 7 shows the results of panel data regression (2), where column (i) to column (vi) adopt different 
methods i.e., ROLL, HL, TOVER, ILLIQ, LR and GAM, to measure liquidity. The explained variable 
here is INVI.  
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As is shown in Table 7, coefficient of investment opportunity Q is positive with a significance level of 
1%, signifying that corporate scale expands when investment opportunity increases. All the correlation 
terms between Q and are negative ROLL, HL, TOVER and ILLIQ are negative, indicating that liquidity 
can safeguard the return from investment opportunity by facilitating financial and lowering cost, and 
leading to capital investment. The coefficient of Liquidity*Q*NEG is positive at 1% significance, 
showing that liquidity can lessen the sensitivity between capital investment and decreasing investment 
opportunity. In companies with higher liquidity, the sensitivity between capital investment and 
investment opportunity is lower. When TOVER and LR is employed to measure liquidity, the 
coefficient of LR*Q is significantly negative, while those of TOVER*Q*NEG and LR*Q*NEG are 
positive at 1% significance. Thus, both TOVER and LR reduce capital efficiency, which is against the 
paper’s expectation. 
 
Table 7. Liquidity and Investment Efficiency 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
Q it-1 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Liquidityit-1 -0.268* -0.225** -0.001* -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.041*** 
(0.160) (0.108) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) 
Liquidityit-1* 
Q it-1 
-0.172* -0.219*** 0 -0.004** -0.002*** -0.011** 
(0.091) (0.054) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Liquidityit-1* 
Q it-1*NEG 
0.373*** 0.105*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.024*** 
(0.079) (0.019) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
CFO it-1 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.141*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SIZE it-1 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005***  0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.022*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 0 0 0.001 0 0.002 0 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.015* 0.014* 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.012 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
AGE it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.103*** -0.0370 0.066*** -0.071*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.008) (0.023) 
N 15250 15228 15359 15360 15371 15228 
R2 0.176 0.177 0.174 0.180 0.174 0.179 
F 40.73 40.53 41.26 41.66 42.80 41.71 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effect; values in the brackets are standard 
variations of robust analysis; 
*** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
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      (0.008) (0.006) 
CASH it-1       0.0370 -0.008 
      (0.032) (0.024) 
AGE it-1       -0.007*** -0.006*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.048*** 2.495*** 0.250*** 2.065*** 0.095*** -0.229** -0.034 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.329) (0.048) (0.659) (0.022) (0.092) (0.066) 
N 1153 1155 1160 1160 1160 1155 1043 992 
R2 0.0550 0.143 0.104 0.0970 0.0780 0.075 0.130 0.207 
F 2.857 8.174 5.742 5.334 4.173 3.967 5.212 8.656 
Note: Values in the brackets are standard variations of robust analysis; 
*** indicates the significance level of 1%;  
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
 
6. Robust Analysis 
For the purpose of testing the relation between stock liquidity and corporate investment, the robust 
analysis is conducted from the following 4 aspects: 
1) Considering the possibility of reverse causality between liquidity and corporate investment, the 
paper analyzes using lagged liquidity to eliminate endogenous error. Furthermore, the paper estimates 
equation. (1) Using panel data model with fixed effect, which contributes to the elimination of 
endogenous errors by controlling unobservable non-time-varied factors such as culture, management’s 
characteristics and heterogeneity of the company. As is shown in Table10, coefficients of HL and 
ILLIQ are significantly negative; those of ROLL and GAM are insignificantly negative; while that of 
TOVER is significantly positive, indicating the positive correlation between liquidity and corporate 
investment. Despite of reduced significance, results in Table 10 is consistent with that in Table 3.  
 
Table 10. Stock Liquidity and INV1 (FE) 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
Liquidiytit-1 -0.0420 -0.185* 0.001* -0.005** -0.001*** -0.004 
(0.131) (0.095) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
Q it-1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.021** 0.022*** 0.021** 0.021** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZE it-1 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009***  -0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALES it-1 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
AGE it-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
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(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.207* 0.202* 0.200* 0.221** 0.0260 0.208* 
(0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.102) (0.107) 
N 15304 15278 15404 15405 15416 15278 
R2 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.071 
F 25.64 25.46 25.95 26.00 25.61 25.38 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects; values in the brackets are standard 
variations of robust analysis; 
*** indicates the significance level of 1%;  
** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%. 
 
2) To tackle with investment persistence, the paper employs lagging dependent variable as explanatory 
variable. Owing to inconsistency between OLS and FE, the paper adopts System GMM for estimation, 
which can successfully cope with problems like investment persistence and endogeneity by use of 
lagging variable as its instrumental variable. Estimation results are shown in Table 11 below.  
As is shown in the Table, the original hypothesis holds true in AR (2)P, indicating no sequence of order 
two relation in residual sequence. According to Sargan’s test, except for column (i), the instrumental 
variables in other columns are all verified, so that the models for the paper are reasonable. Besides, the 
coefficient of INV1it-1 is significantly positive with the 1% significance, manifesting the continuity of 
capital investment. In the results of HL, ILLIQ and GAM, their coefficients are negative with the 1% 
significance; while in the results of TOVER and LR, the coefficients are significantly positive. Thus, 
there is a positive correlation between liquidity and capital investment, which is with the conclusion 
drawn in previous chapters. 
 
Table 11. Stock Liquidity and INV1 (Panel Data Model) 
 (i) ROLL (ii) HL (iii) TOVER (iv) ILLIQ (v) LR  (vi) GAM 
INV1 it-1 0.346*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.346*** 0.349*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Liquidityit-1 0.009 -0.190*** 0.001* -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.007*** 
(0.091) (0.069) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Q it-1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO it-1 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
SIZE it-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.00100  0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
LEV it-1 -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALES it-1 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CASH it-1 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
AGE it-1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.039 -0.020 -0.031 -0.009 0.034** -0.056** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) 
N 12763 12767 12770 12770 12780 12767 
χ2 4554.3 4642.37 4939.38 4665.27 2822.71 4615.09 
AR(2) P 0.847 0.767 0.709 0.733 0.811 0.847 
Sargan P 0.036 0.054 0.131 0.180 0.146 0.115 
Note: All the models include year and industry fixed effects; values in the brackets are standard 
variations of robust analysis;  
*** indicates the significance level of 1%; 
** indicates the significance level of 5%; 
* indicates the significance level of 10%; 
AR(2) P is the result of sequence of order two; Sargan P is the test of instrumental variables’ 
rationality. 
  
3) With referring to the method of Tong Pan and Zhengfei Lu (2005), the paper measures corporate 
investment by the annual change of fixed assets, building projects and project materials, which is 
standardized as INV2it. The paper re-estimates the results in Table4 to Table7, by use of INV2it as its 
explained variable. As a result, liquidity is indeed in positive correlation with corporate investment, 
which is stronger in growth-type companies with financial constraint and higher operating risks. The 
equation of investment efficiency shows that liquidity can strengthen the sensitivity (Note 7) between 
investment and investment opportunity, while its function could be reversible in case of decreasing 
investment opportunity.  
4) Considering the inefficient capital market, the paper measure investment opportunity by revenue 
growth rate SGROW, with referring to Xin Qingquan’s (2007) method, to re-estimate the result in 
Table4. As a result, a positive correlation is found between liquidity and corporate investment. 
 
7. Conclusion 
With Chinese listed non-financial companies from 1998 to 2011 as analyzing sample, the paper studies 
the relationship among stock liquidity, investment scale and capital efficiency from the perspective of 
market microstructure. We found that investment scale is positively correlate to liquidity, and corporate 
characteristics can exerts certain influence. In growth-type companies with financial constraint and 
higher operating risks, liquidity imposes strong influence on corporate investment. Additionally, 
companies with higher liquidity are more sensitive to investment opportunity. The results generated 
from different measurement and the robust analysis by SSE 180 index all exhibit conclusions listed 
above. 
The results of the paper can be applies to policy making from the following two aspects. Firstly, listed 
companies can cut equity cost and financial constraint by raising liquidity, which can also benefit 
long-term, more profitable financial, expand investment scale and increase shareholders’ profit. 
Liquidity can tackle with information asymmetry by raising information embedded in stock price and 
improve CEO’s payment-performance sensitivity and investment efficiency. Therefore, listed 
companies should strive to improve equity and capital structure, as well as corporate governance to 
safeguard outside shareholders’ benefit and stock liquidity. Another implication is that authorities 
should further implement information disclosure, promote the development of investment and security 
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analyst agency, and crack down on black-box trade. In so doing, information asymmetry will diminish, 
and investors’ equity, fair trades in the market and market liquidity can be realized. 
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Notes 
Note 1. There are two flaws in the empirical evidence of Q theory: one is a higher capital adjustment 
cost under lower R2 model; the other is the significant implication of cash flow, apart from Tobin Q, 
which represents investment opportunity. 
Note 2. For the reason that the correlation between LR and SIZE is as high as 0.6, SIZE is not controlled 
in the equation of LR. 
Note 3. To avoid the impact of extreme values, the paper has measured financial constraint by different 
means like DTIER, TIER, as well as DCASHDIV and DSIZE. All the measurement generates similar 
conclusions. 
Note 4. The paper measures corporate growth by DQ defined by Tobin Q, and draws the same 
conclusion.  
Note 5. The paper draws similar conclusion analyzing with DSIGMA.  
Note 6. The paper also employs added stocks as analyzing samples, and has found that liquidity 
measured by ILLIQ, LR and GAM increases significantly after the added year, compared with the 
previous three years, while INV1 and INV2 have not changed much. 
Note 7. Some of the results are not reported in the paper. Please inquire the author in case that you are 
in need of the data. 
 
